This month I read an interesting report "China and the global economic crisis", by Guy de Jonquières, who is currently a senior fellow at the ECIPE, an independent policy research think tank in Brussels. Guy was the former Financial Times columnist for Asia. Besides his excellent insights in his new report, I'll never forget the last column he filed, in which he drew together eight impressions he gathered while covering the region. I would like to share his eight highlights with you, along with a couple of my thoughts.

First, not all of East Asia is an economic miracle: today, it is overwhelmingly a China story. China has generated more than half of the growth in developing Asia this century.

Second, China has no master plan. Its one constant is the leadership's dedication to remaining in power. In practice, the leadership's claim to political legitimacy hinges on its ability to keep living standards rising for as many people as possible. The pursuit of that goal is essentially pragmatic and experimental; the government often takes one step back for every two steps forward. That is a prudent choice when there are so many incalculable risks in economic policy. The biggest risk is how economics will ultimately influence political change in China – the political equivalent of portfolio theory.

Two other factors make governing China a tightrope act. One is the central government's struggle to control local officials, who have taken the injunction to enrich their regions all too literally – enriching themselves in the process. The other is the growing influence of vested interests that have asserted themselves more strongly under a less radically reform-minded leadership. Lobby politics is now at least as important in shaping policy in Beijing as in Washington, as seen in recent legislation such as April's Postal Law, which has protectionist aspects.

Economics rules Asian diplomacy. In a region driven by age-old hostilities, the interdependence created by trade – particularly in the form of cross-border production networks – is the most powerful underpinning of stability.

Next, it will be a long time, if ever, before Asia forms a closely integrated economic bloc. In addition to mutual suspicions between nations, rivalry for regional influence between China and Japan – and probably, in time, India – will make meaningful agreements hard to achieve. Furthermore, the institutional cooperation that deeper integration would require is frustrated by Asian governments' jealous defence of sovereignty and the weakness in many of their domestic institutions.

Finally, the importance of Chinese "soft power" is overrated. Most of Beijing’s diplomatic overtures around the world are driven first and foremost by economic need, above all its quest for secure supplies of energy and war materials. Truly effective soft power is based on the projection of intrinsically appealing national ideals, principles and values. However wantonly those assets, Guy suspects most Asians, given the choice, would still opt for the – albeit tarnished – American dream over China's alternative.